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BITES DOES DHS GET AT THE DEPORTATION 
APPLE? 
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ABSTRACT 
  The common law doctrine of res judicata prevents parties from 
relitigating claims that were, or could have been, litigated in a previous 
proceeding. In the background of all civil law, the doctrine has been 
regularly applied to executive agency adjudications. However, recent 
developments have highlighted a circuit split and tension between the 
branches of government, as different adjudicative bodies have come to 
differing conclusions on whether, and to what extent, res judicata 
applies in removal proceedings.   
  This Note argues that res judicata should apply broadly and 
uniformly in removal proceedings, limiting the Department of 
Homeland Security (“DHS”) to only one bite at the deportation apple. 
The text and structure of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as well 
as its judicial interpretations and the regulations created to enforce it, 
command this result. Furthermore, the principles of fairness, reliance, 
and efficiency that drive res judicata are especially salient as immigrant 
defendants face unique challenges while the U.S. immigration system 
becomes increasingly overburdened. This Note concludes with a survey 
of the available avenues to reach a uniform application of the doctrine 
and to provide much needed clarity for the adjudicators applying the 
law, the lawyers on both sides, and the noncitizens facing one of the 
most severe penalties—deportation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When Adrian Moncrieffe was a toddler, he legally immigrated to 
the United States from Jamaica with his family.1 Over the next twenty-
three years, Adrian lived in the United States without incident.2 He 
received an education and worked in multiple industries,3 including 
home health care.4 He became a legal permanent resident, married a 
U.S. citizen, and started a family of his own in Georgia.5  
Adrian’s life was derailed in 2007 when he was pulled over while 
driving with a friend.6 During the stop, police found 1.3 grams of 
marijuana in his car, which “is the equivalent of about two or three 
marijuana cigarettes.”7 Adrian was charged with and pleaded guilty to 
a Georgia state offense: possession of marijuana with the intent to 
distribute.8 While the relevant statute covers distribution of up to ten 
pounds of marijuana,9 it also criminalizes “the social sharing of small 
amounts of the drug for no remuneration.”10 His attorney did not warn 
him of any potential immigration consequences of his guilty plea or 
subsequent conviction.11 Because he was a first-time offender, he was 
not sentenced to prison time.12 Instead, his record was eligible for 
expungement after successful completion of probation.13 
But Adrian was not out of the woods. Two years later, he was 
arrested by federal immigration officials who claimed that his Georgia 
marijuana conviction qualified as an aggravated felony,14 which is a 
 
 1.  Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 188 (2013); Nina Totenberg, Justices Say U.S. 
Improperly Deported Man over Marijuana, NPR (Apr. 23, 2013, 5:25 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2013/04/23/178651009/justices-say-u-s-improperly-deported-man-over-marijuana 
[https://perma.cc/V2TR-J7BY]. 
 2.  Totenberg, supra note 1. 
 3.  Brief for the Petitioner at 4, Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. 184 (No. 11-702). 
 4.  Totenberg, supra note 1. 
 5.  Id.  
 6.  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 3, at 5. 
 7.  Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 188. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  GA. CODE ANN. § 16-13-30(j)(1) (2017); see also id. § 16-13-31(c) (listing heightened 
punishments for offenses involving more than ten pounds of marijuana).  
 10.  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 3, at 5. 
 11.  Totenberg, supra note 1. 
 12.  Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 188–89. 
 13.  Id. at 189. 
 14.  Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2018) 
(listing the various crimes that qualify as aggravated felonies). 
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deportable offense under federal law.15 Despite having almost no 
meaningful connections left in Jamaica,16 Adrian was deported.17 The 
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed the removal,18 and 
the Fifth Circuit denied Adrian’s petition for review.19 The U.S. 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split regarding 
the scope of drug-related aggravated felonies.20 
In 2013, the Court held that Adrian’s marijuana conviction was 
not an aggravated felony.21 The relevant aggravated felony charge was 
a “drug trafficking crime,”22 which includes “any felony punishable 
under the Controlled Substances Act.”23 Controlled Substances Act 
(“CSA”) violations are not felonies if they involve “distributing a small 
amount of marihuana for no remuneration.”24 Because a conviction 
under the Georgia statute “[did] not reveal whether either 
remuneration or more than a small amount of marijuana was 
involved,” the conviction did not necessarily amount to a felony under 
the CSA.25 In other words, Adrian could have been convicted under 
the Georgia statute without meeting the aggravated felony 
requirements.26 
Writing for the majority, Justice Sonia Sotomayor clarified that 
“[e]scaping aggravated felony treatment does not mean escaping 
deportation.”27 Importantly, the Georgia marijuana conviction 
 
 15.  INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 3, at 6; 
see also infra Part I.A.2 (detailing the relationship between the federal deportability scheme and 
state law).  
 16.  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 3, at 5. 
 17.  Totenberg, supra note 1. 
 18.  “Removal” is synonymous with “deportation.” Deportation, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).  
 19.  Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 189 (2013). 
 20.  Id. at 189–90. Specifically, the circuit split concerned “whether a conviction under a 
statute that” covered both felony and misdemeanor drug offenses could be an aggravated felony. 
Id.  
 21.  Id. at 195. 
 22.  INA § 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2018). 
 23.  18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) (2018).  
 24.  21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(4) (2018); see also § 841(b)(1)(D) (making the exception applicable 
for offenses involving “less than 50 kilograms of marihuana”). 
 25.  Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 194–95.  
 26.  Adrian was found with a small amount of marijuana, and there was no evidence of 
payment apparent from the record. Id. at 194. However, under the categorical approach, the 
courts disregard the underlying facts of the conviction, and instead look to see if the fact of 
conviction alone proves that the noncitizen has committed a deportable offense. See infra notes 
80–85 and accompanying text (explaining the categorical approach).  
 27.  Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 204. 
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qualified as another deportable offense: a controlled substances 
offense.28 Although not the subject of the appeal, the Department of 
Homeland Security (“DHS”) had also charged Adrian as deportable 
for this offense.29  
Imagine that DHS had only brought the aggravated felony charge 
against Adrian. After the Supreme Court had vindicated Adrian on 
this charge, could DHS bring him back to square one and attempt to 
deport him for the controlled substances offense? Is it possible for an 
individual to be found deportable after the government has already 
once failed to show that a conviction constituted a deportable offense? 
The answer depends on whether, and to what extent, the next 
court would apply res judicata, otherwise known as claim preclusion. 
Because Adrian was originally charged under both theories, Justice 
Sotomayor did not directly address the res judicata question. But she 
did assert that the Court generally favors a “degree of imperfection to 
the heavy burden of relitigating old prosecutions.”30  
Multiple circuits and the BIA have weighed in on res judicata in 
removal cases.31 Recently, in Arangure v. Whitaker,32 the Sixth Circuit 
ruled that res judicata does apply in removal proceedings.33 But shortly 
thereafter, the BIA declined to adopt the Sixth Circuit’s precedent—
reflecting an underlying circuit split and disagreement among branches 
of the government.34 
As a whole, applications of res judicata principles in the 
deportation context are varied and fraught with exceptions.35 For 
example, circuit courts disagree about how res judicata should apply 
when the defendant has multiple underlying offenses or convictions.36 
Particularly, disagreement arises over whether DHS should have to 
bring all deportability charges—across all existing convictions—at 
 
 28.  Id.; INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2018). Although not asserted 
here, this offense also includes a carve-out for “a single offense involving possession for one’s own 
use of 30 grams or less of marijuana.” Id.  
 29.  Brief for Respondent in Opposition at 3, Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. 184 (No. 11-702). 
 30.  Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 205 (defending the categorical approach discussed in Part I.A.2). 
 31.  See infra Part II. 
 32.  Arangure v. Whitaker, 911 F.3d 333 (6th Cir. 2018). This Note refers to the Sixth Circuit 
case as Arangure v. Whitaker or Arangure and to the BIA case below as Matter of Jasso Arangure 
or In re Jasso Arangure.   
 33.  Id. at 345. 
 34.  In re Gavino Quito, 2019 WL 2464431, at *2 (B.I.A. Feb. 13, 2019); see also infra Part 
II.B.3. (describing the BIA’s decision to not align its precedent with the Sixth Circuit). 
 35.  See infra Part II. 
 36.  See infra note 116 and accompanying text.  
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once.37 This produces a haphazard administration of justice as the BIA 
attempts—or declines—to follow conflicting precedent.  
This disjointed application of the law is incompatible with the 
integrity and justice that the American legal system aims to uphold. It 
leaves everyone involved in a state of confusion: immigrants are unable 
to rely on favorable deportability rulings, lawyers are unable to 
properly advise their clients on potential consequences of their 
decisions, and judges are unable to cleanly navigate the confines of 
preclusion set out in this precedential maze. Defining a clear standard 
for all tribunals making deportation determinations would promote the 
uniformity, justice, and efficiency that our immigration system so 
desperately needs.  
This Note argues that Adrian—and others like him—should not 
be subject to new theories of deportability based on convictions that 
were previously litigated. Res judicata should apply in removal 
proceedings and bar relitigation of convictions found not to warrant 
deportation. This Note contends that DHS should be required to bring 
all available charges of deportability at once, regardless of the number 
of underlying offenses or convictions. As one court aptly put it, DHS 
should not be able to take “an infinite number of trips around the 
carousel in repeated efforts to grab the brass ring missed on the first 
try.”38 
This Note fills a gap in scholarly literature by focusing almost 
exclusively on how res judicata should apply in removal proceedings 
after Arangure.39 Part I of this Note builds a foundational 
understanding of immigration law and res judicata. It draws 
comparisons between the constitutional protections afforded to 
immigration and criminal defendants, and it discusses the statutory 
 
 37.  Id.  
 38.  Medina v. INS, 993 F.2d 499, 503 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 39.  For an argument that federal common law defenses, including res judicata, should 
generally apply in immigration cases, see generally Fatma E. Marouf, Invoking Federal Common 
Law Defenses in Immigration Cases, 66 UCLA L. REV. 142 (2019). For a comprehensive, pre-
Arangure discussion of res judicata in all immigration proceedings, see generally Karen Moulding, 
Annotation, Application of Res Judicata Doctrine in Removal, Deportation, Exclusion, or 
Denaturalization Proceedings, 74 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 341 (2013). For a brief evaluation of Matter of 
Jasso Arangure before it reached the Sixth Circuit, see Alicia Triche, Matter of Jasso Arangure 
Blows a Huge Hole in Res Judicata, FED. LAW., May 2018, at 12, 37 (admonishing the BIA’s 
decision not to apply res judicata). There is more scholarship pertaining to the related doctrine of 
collateral estoppel as it applies to immigration law as a whole. See generally, e.g., Greg 
Pennington, A Preclusive Effect: Issue Preclusion in Immigration Practice, IMMIGR. L. ADVISOR 
(U.S. Dep’t of Just., Exec. Off. for Immigr. Rev., D.C.), Jan. 2015 (guiding courts on how to apply 
collateral estoppel in immigration proceedings). 
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scheme for deportation established by the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (“INA”)40 and relevant enforcement regulations. Part II surveys 
precedent and current implementation of res judicata in removal 
proceedings. It gives special attention to the most recent circuit case on 
point, Arangure, and dissects the BIA’s prior rejection of res judicata, 
the Sixth Circuit’s embrace of the doctrine, and the BIA’s subsequent 
rebuff of the Sixth Circuit’s decision. Part III analyzes the arguments 
made by courts, identifying textual and structural reasons res judicata 
should apply in removal proceedings. Part IV examines the underlying 
reasons for applying preclusion, including fairness, finality, and 
efficiency. It argues that in a complex and overburdened system, 
uniformity in applying res judicata will help alleviate uncertainty and 
reduce administrative waste. Part V promotes a uniform and 
comprehensive application of res judicata and explores the options for 
implementing such a solution.    
I.  FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES 
This Part establishes the background necessary for understanding 
the ways in which res judicata does—and should—apply in removal 
proceedings. First, it provides a high-level overview of relevant 
concepts in U.S. immigration law and adjudication. Next, it outlines the 
basics of the res judicata doctrine and how it has been applied in 
administrative settings. 
A. Relevant Concepts in Immigration Law 
Immigration law is a particularly “extensive and complex” branch 
of civil law.41 In some respects, it “has long been a maverick, a wild 
card” in American law: “In a legal firmament transformed by 
revolutions in due process and equal protection doctrine and by a new 
conception of judicial role, immigration law remains the realm in which 
government authority is at the zenith, and individual entitlement is at 
the nadir.”42 This Section aims to unravel some of these complexities 
as they may relate to removal proceedings and potential relitigation. 
First, it establishes the constitutional framework and provides an 
overview of the authority allocated to the branches of government. 
 
 40.  Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) 
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2018)).  
 41.  Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 395 (2012). 
 42.  Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 
(1984).  
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Next, it describes the statutory framework that governs immigration 
law and explains the process of deportation. Lastly, it outlines 
enforcement regulations that inform the ways in which res judicata can 
apply in removal proceedings.  
1. Constitutional Framework and Distribution of Regulatory and 
Adjudicatory Authority.  Defendants facing civil immigration charges 
are not afforded “most of the constitutional procedures required for 
criminal prosecutions.”43 They have no “Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel, and only a limited Fourth Amendment [protection] against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”44 There is also “no Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination”45 nor double 
jeopardy protections46 because deportation is not considered 
punitive.47 Immigration defendants are protected by some Fifth 
Amendment procedural safeguards as well as “[the Due Process] 
Clause’s deep commitment to personal liberty,” although these rights 
are “applied more loosely” in the immigration context than in the 
criminal context.48 
The Constitution vests Congress with the power “[t]o establish an 
uniform Rule of Naturalization.”49 Along with this vested authority, 
the federal government enjoys broad power over immigration policy 
and noncitizens because of its inherent sovereign power over foreign 
relations and national security.50 Although the separation of powers 
contours of immigration authority have never been clearly established, 
twenty-first century immigration law is arguably dominated by the 
executive branch, with notions of both inherent executive power and 
 
 43.  CÉSAR CUAUHTÉMOC GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, CRIMMIGRATION LAW 5 (2015). 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id.  
 46.  U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”).  
 47.  Cf. HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 43, at 94 (explaining that the clause does not apply for 
immigration detention because detention is civil and not punitive).  
 48.  Id. at 6, 13, 105. For example, noncitizens are entitled to deportation hearings, but these 
hearings are in front of executive, not judicial, officers. Id. at 6. Immigration judges may also 
address multiple defendants at once. Id. at 13. But see AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, A PRIMER ON 
EXPEDITED REMOVAL 2 (2019), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/
research/primer_on_expedited_removal.pdf [https://perma.cc/8J7T-BEPR] (describing 
expedited removal, in which immigration officials can circumvent due process protections and 
remove certain noncitizens at their discretion). 
 49.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 50.  Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 394–95 (2012). 
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delegated congressional power over the subject.51 At any rate, the 
plenary power doctrine, which “sharply limit[s] judicial scrutiny of the 
immigration rules,” leaves immigration law largely to the political 
branches.52  
Immigration adjudications, including removal proceedings, are 
housed within the Department of Justice’s Executive Office for 
Immigration Review (“EOIR”).53 The EOIR oversees hundreds of 
Immigration Judges (“IJs”) who manage trial-level adjudications in 
more than sixty immigration courts across the country.54 The EOIR 
also oversees the BIA, which hears appeals from the immigration 
courts as “the highest administrative body for interpreting and 
applying immigration laws.”55 BIA decisions can be “modified or 
overruled by the Attorney General” or by “judicial review in the 
federal courts”56 as they are directly appealable to circuit courts.57 
Circuit court decisions are binding on the BIA when it is deciding cases 
within that circuit, and thus, the BIA applies different circuit precedent 
depending on which court would hear an appeal.58 
 
 51.  Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE 
L.J. 458, 465–66 (2009). Professors Cox and Rodríguez identify a “regulatory asymmetry” in 
which the president has policy-making authority over removing noncitizens while Congress 
retains the authority over admitting noncitizens. Id. at 485. However, in recent years, the 
president has been granted broad discretion over admission as well. See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 
138 S. Ct. 2392, 2408 (2018) (upholding President Trump’s executive order “travel ban” as a 
proper use of executive discretion). 
 52.  Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 51, at 460. 
 53. About the Office, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/about-office [https://perma.cc/P6SX-UUMP]. 
 54.  Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/office-of-the-chief-immigration-judge [https://perma.cc/A3LV-V8GE]. 
 55.  Board of Immigration Appeals, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals [https://perma.cc/2C9E-D7BS].  
 56.  Id.; see also In re E-L-H-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 814, 815 (B.I.A. 2005) (“[A] Board precedent 
decision applies to all proceedings involving the same issue unless and until it is modified or 
overruled by the Attorney General, the Board, Congress, or a Federal court.”); 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.1(d)(1), (h) (2020) (outlining the attorney general’s authority over the BIA and its 
decisions).  
 57.  INA § 242(a)(1), (b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), (b)(2) (2018); HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 
43, at 18. 
 58.  Ballesteros v. Ashcroft, 452 F.3d 1153, 1157 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[A]n immigration judge 
should analyze removability and relief issues using only the decisions of the circuit in which he or 
she sits . . . since it is to that circuit that any appeal from a final order of removal must be taken.” 
(quoting In re Ballesteros, 2004 WL 1167187, at *4 (B.I.A. Feb. 18, 2004))); HERNÁNDEZ, supra 
note 43, at 18. But see Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 
982 (2005) (“[P]rior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise 
entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction follows 
from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”).  
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In immigration matters, judicial deference is especially important 
because of the executive’s “especially sensitive political functions that 
implicate questions of foreign relations.”59 Thus, the BIA is typically 
eligible for Chevron deference when interpreting the INA.60 Under 
Chevron,61 federal courts must defer to an administrative agency’s 
interpretation of law if (1) the statute is ambiguous and (2) the agency 
interpretation is reasonable,62 inquiries referred to as Chevron step one 
and step two, respectively. However, the Chevron framework is only 
applicable when an agency is exercising authority delegated to it by 
Congress.63 Furthermore, only interpretations “carrying the force of 
law” are eligible for Chevron deference.64 Circuit courts that have 
addressed the issue have held that unpublished, and therefore 
nonprecedential, BIA decisions do not carry the force of law.65 This 
poses questions of if and when the judiciary should defer to the BIA’s 
interpretation of whether the INA obliges application of res judicata.66 
This Note argues that the BIA is not eligible for deference because: (1) 
Congress has not delegated authority to the BIA to determine the 
question and (2) the INA is unambiguous regarding res judicata.67 
2. The INA and the Deportation Pipeline.  The INA, as amended 
over the past seven decades, is the basis for immigration law in the 
United States.68 It establishes the bases for inadmissibility and 
deportability, which, although distinct from each other, both result in 
 
 59.  Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 517 (2009) (quoting INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 
(1988)). 
 60.  Id. at 516.  
 61.  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  
 62.  Id. at 842–43. 
 63.  United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001). 
 64.  Id.  
 65.  See, e.g., Arobelidze v. Holder, 653 F.3d 513, 519–20 (7th Cir. 2011) (discussing the 
decisions of other circuit courts in overruling a Seventh Circuit decision to the contrary). 
 66.  See infra Part III.A. Although beyond the scope of this Note, there is some disagreement 
about whether res judicata is a purely procedural matter (where agencies have broad discretion) 
or an issue of statutory interpretation (where Chevron deference is applicable). Compare Johnson 
v. Whitehead, 647 F.3d 120, 128–29 (4th Cir. 2011) (preclusion as a procedural matter), with 
Arangure v. Whitaker, 911 F.3d 333, 345 n.7 (6th Cir. 2018) (res judicata as a matter of statutory 
interpretation). This Note assumes that it is an issue of statutory interpretation. See Astoria Fed. 
Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991) (assessing res judicata as a matter of 
statutory interpretation).  
 67.  See infra Part III.A. 
 68.  Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., 
https://www.uscis.gov/legal-resources/immigration-and-nationality-act [https://perma.cc/8MKH-
QV7G].  
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the removal of noncitizens unless they are entitled to some form of 
relief. Inadmissibility applies to those who are “ineligible” for 
admission to the United States.69 Deportability, on the other hand, 
applies to those who were formally “admitted” to the United States but 
have since lost legal permission to remain in the country.70 Although 
the INA prescribes criminal penalties for some violations, removal is a 
civil remedy.71 INA § 237 lists the various deportability charges that 
immigration officials72 may bring against noncitizens.73 Among the 
offenses that can lead to deportation are immigration violations, such 
as overstaying a visa or simply being “[p]resent in violation of law.”74 
Criminal offenses, including crimes involving moral turpitude, 
aggravated felonies, certain drug offenses, firearm offenses, crimes of 
domestic violence, and trafficking, also render noncitizens 
deportable.75 This includes a sweeping number of offenses; aggravated 
felonies alone include twenty-eight different categories of crime, 
ranging from murder to alteration of a passport.76  
Charges under § 237(a)(2) are predicated on separate, underlying 
criminal convictions—whether federal, state, or local. In other words, 
immigration officials bring deportation charges based on convictions 
that noncitizens have already received.77 Immigration officials can 
 
 69.  INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2018). 
 70.  INA § 237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”) established this distinction insofar as it relies on the 
“admission” of a noncitizen. Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 308(f), 110 Stat. 3621–22 (codified at 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1182, 1227).   
 71.  E.g., Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 396 (2012). 
 72.  Immigration officials are housed under the Department of Homeland Security 
(“DHS”). Immigration Enforcement Actions, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/enforcement-actions [https://perma.cc/ZQU6-ZVTF]. 
Relevant DHS agencies include Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), Customs and 
Border Protection (“CBP”), and Citizen and Immigration Services (“USCIS”). Id. ICE works in 
the interior of the country, looking to identify and remove noncitizens without authorization to 
be in the country, including those who are removable due to criminal convictions. Id. CBP is 
stationed at entry points along the U.S. border and makes decisions about whether noncitizens 
are admissible. Id. USCIS handles the administration and processing of affirmative immigration 
applications, such as asylum and student visa applications. Id. 
 73.  INA § 237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227. 
 74.  INA § 237(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1). A noncitizen may also be deportable if they are 
found to have been inadmissible at their time of entry or when attempting to adjust their 
immigration status. Id.  
 75.  INA § 237(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2). 
 76.  INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).  
 77.  The definition of conviction is broader in the immigration law setting than in the criminal 
law setting. Therefore, a noncitizen may be found “convicted” of a crime for immigration 
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bring charges at any point after the conviction,78 often resulting in a 
looming threat of deportation for years after a criminal proceeding has 
ended.79  
To determine if an underlying conviction qualifies as a deportable 
offense, courts use the “categorical approach.”80 This complex test81 
evaluates the necessary requirements for conviction of the underlying 
offense and compares it to the federal removability charge. If an 
underlying statute criminalizes behavior that is not necessarily covered 
by the deportability charge, then the statute is overbroad, and the 
noncitizen is not deportable for a conviction under that statute.82 For 
example, Adrian Moncrieffe was not deportable for an illicit-
trafficking aggravated felony because the Georgia statute of conviction 
penalizes misdemeanor and felony drug offenses, whereas the federal 
aggravated felony definition only covers felony drug offenses.83 On the 
other hand, if the underlying offense fits squarely within the federal 
deportability charge, the noncitizen is deportable for that charge. 
Notably, the categorical approach looks only at the fact of conviction 
and disregards the particular facts of the defendant’s case.84 Thus, 
someone who actually committed an offense that fits within the 
definition of a federal removability charge will not be deported if the 
statute of conviction also criminalizes behavior that does not fit within 
the deportability charge.85  
Adding to the complexity, deportability charges are often 
predicated on state convictions. More often than not, state criminal 
laws do not track the exact language of federal deportability offenses. 
Nor do these offenses align among states. Therefore, a conviction 
 
purposes, even if they were not convicted in a criminal court or if their conviction was expunged 
by the state. INA § 101(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A). 
 78.  See INA § 237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (imposing no statute of limitations on deportability 
charges). 
 79.  See, e.g., Johnson v. Whitehead, 647 F.3d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 2011) (deportability charges 
predicated on convictions from six and nineteen years prior); Bravo-Pedroza v. Gonzales, 475 
F.3d 1358, 1358–59 (9th Cir. 2007) (deportability charges predicated on convictions from four and 
five years prior). 
 80.  E.g., Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1986 (2015).  
 81.  For a more thorough discussion of the categorical approach, see HERNÁNDEZ, supra 
note 43, at 30–41. 
 82.  Id. at 33.  
 83.  Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 195–96 (2013). 
 84.  Id. at 190.   
 85.  See id. at 205 (“[W]e err on the side of underinclusiveness because ambiguity in criminal 
statutes referenced by the INA must be construed in the noncitizen’s favor.”).  
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under one state law may lead to deportability while a conviction under 
another state’s law—prohibiting the same general activity—would 
not.86 And because convictions are separate from deportability 
charges, DHS can—and often does—bring multiple deportability 
charges based on one conviction.87 Under the categorical approach, 
one theory of deportability may fail whereas another may succeed. So, 
the question becomes whether DHS must bring all of its theories of 
deportability at once, or if it may bring a new theory after an original 
theory fails.  
3. Regulatory Guidelines for Enforcement.  The EOIR 
promulgates regulations for immigration officials and judges. One such 
regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.30, dictates when new charges may be 
brought against a noncitizen: “At any time during deportation or 
removal proceedings, additional or substituted charges of deportability 
and/or factual allegations may be lodged by [DHS] in writing.”88 To aid 
in applying res judicata principles, the regulations also specify that an 
immigration decision “becomes final upon waiver of appeal or upon 
expiration of the time to appeal.”89 Removal proceedings are not final 
when the case is remanded,90 when a case is administratively closed,91 
or when there is a temporary stay of the proceedings.92 BIA decisions 
are final, however, even when they are appealed to the circuit courts.93 
Debate persists about the scope of § 1003.30, particularly 
regarding the word “may.” The Ninth Circuit views the regulation as 
 
 86.  See, e.g., Islas-Veloz v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d 1249, 1257 (9th Cir. 2019) (Fletcher, J., 
concurring) (“Some convictions under state hit-and-run statutes are crimes involving moral 
turpitude while other convictions are not.”). 
 87.  See Marouf, supra note 39, at 179 (“A noncitizen placed in removal proceedings is 
normally charged with one or more inadmissibility or deportability grounds under the INA.”); see 
also Yong Wong Park v. Att’y Gen., 472 F.3d 66, 73 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[I]t is not uncommon for the 
DHS to conceive of a single crime as qualifying both as a crime involving moral turpitude and as 
an aggravated felony.”). 
 88.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.30 (2020). 
 89.  Id. § 1003.39. 
 90.  Id. §§ 1003.1(d)(7), 1003.47(h). 
 91.  E.g., Karim v. Mukasey, 269 F. App’x 5, 7 (1st Cir. 2008); see also Romero v. Barr, 937 
F.3d 282, 287–88 (4th Cir. 2019) (“After the case is administratively closed, either party may 
reactivate the case by filing a motion to re-calendar.”). The attorney general limited the ability of 
IJs and the BIA to administratively close their cases. In re Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271, 293 
(Att’y Gen. 2018). However, this decision has been challenged in the circuit courts with some 
success. E.g., Romero, 937 F.3d at 297 (abrogating Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271). 
 92.  Moulding, supra note 39, § 2. 
 93.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(7); INA § 242(b)(9), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) (2018) (stating that 
circuit courts can only review final orders).  
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giving DHS the ability to assert new claims during the removal 
proceeding, but not after the proceeding has become final.94 In 
contrast, at least one other circuit finds the word “may” to be more 
permissive.95 Under this interpretation, the fact that DHS may bring 
new charges during the proceedings does not preclude DHS from 
bringing new charges after the proceeding has been terminated.96  
B. Res Judicata: From Common Law to Administrative Adjudication 
Res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, is derived from 
common law.97 The doctrine “bar[s] the same parties from litigating a 
second lawsuit on the same claim, or any other claim arising from the 
same transaction or series of transactions and that could have been—
but was not—raised in the first suit.”98 It applies if the same issue was 
previously litigated, there was “a final judgment on the merits,” and 
the same parties were involved.99 Res judicata encourages parties to 
bring any and all claims against each other in one proceeding, limiting 
them to only one bite at the apple.100 This goal of efficiency is prevalent 
throughout civil law and is a driving force behind the related doctrine 
of collateral estoppel,101 as well as procedural rules surrounding 
counterclaims,102 joinder,103 and supplemental jurisdiction.104 
The Supreme Court has held that common law principles, such as 
res judicata, should be read into legislation as long as Congress has not 
 
 94.  See Bravo-Pedroza v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 1358, 1360 (9th Cir. 2007) (“It says nothing 
about new charges after one proceeding is over.”). 
 95.  See Channer v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 527 F.3d 275, 282 (2d Cir. 2008) (“The 
regulation permits but does not affirmatively require DHS to supplement already existing 
charges.”); see also Arangure v. Whitaker, 911 F.3d 333, 346 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing § 1003.30 with 
emphasis on “may”).  
 96.  Channer, 527 F.3d at 282 (“[W]e do not find that § 3.30 required DHS to lodge all 
deportation charges against [defendant] in a single proceeding.”).  
 97.  Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 107 (1991). 
 98.  Res Judicata, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 99.  Id.  
 100.  Pennington, supra note 39, at 2. 
 101.  Id. Collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, is a “narrower . . . cousin” of res 
judicata. Id. This doctrine bars relitigation of discrete issues that were actually decided in prior 
litigation, even if the two suits are unrelated. Id. 
 102.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a)(1)(A) (requiring pleaders to bring counterclaims against a 
party if they “arise out of the [same] transaction or occurrence” as the other party’s claim).  
 103.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a) (allowing parties to join if their claims for relief arise out of the 
same transaction or occurrence). 
 104.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2018) (granting a federal court supplemental jurisdiction over 
claims arising out of the same action as a claim where the federal court has original jurisdiction).  
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expressed a clear intent to exclude them.105 Exclusionary intent can 
manifest “through explicit text or through an obvious inference from 
the statute’s structure.”106  
Historically, preclusion has applied in all adjudications regardless 
of whether the relevant forum is a court or an agency.107 As such, “a 
valid and final adjudicative determination by an administrative 
tribunal has the same effects under the rules of res judicata, subject to 
the same exceptions and qualifications, as a judgment of a court.”108 
Nonetheless, some circuit courts have found that res judicata is more 
“flexibl[e]” in administrative proceedings.109 Res judicata’s “suitability 
may vary according to the specific context of the rights at stake, the 
power of the agency, and the relative adequacy of agency 
procedures.”110 Regarding issues that are initially adjudicated in 
administrative fora, relitigation in federal courts may be “warranted if 
there is reason to doubt the quality, extensiveness, or fairness of 
procedures followed in prior litigation.”111  
II.  A PRECEDENTIAL MAZE 
Over the last few decades, courts have come to varying 
conclusions about if, and how, res judicata should apply in removal 
proceedings. This Part explores the different approaches that have led 
to this divergence and the most recent developments in the 
precedential landscape. 
 
 105.  See Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991) (finding that 
common law “rules of preclusion” should be read into a statute unless Congress indicates 
otherwise).  
 106.  Arangure v. Whitaker, 911 F.3d 333, 344 (6th Cir. 2018).  
 107.  See United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966) (“When an 
administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact properly 
before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate, the courts have not 
hesitated to apply res judicata to enforce repose.”). Cf. Duvall v. Att’y Gen., 436 F.3d 382, 390 (3d 
Cir. 2006) (referencing the longstanding assumption that collateral estoppel applies in all 
“adjudicative” proceedings). 
 108.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83(1) (AM. L. INST. 1982). 
 109.  See, e.g., Alvear-Velez v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e have applied 
res judicata much more flexibly in the administrative context.”). 
 110.  Astoria, 501 U.S. at 109–10.  
 111.  B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., 575 U.S. 138, 158 (2015) (quoting Montana v. 
United States, 440 U.S. 147, 164 n.11 (1979)). 
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A. Pre-Arangure State of Affairs 
Although Arangure is the most recent—and perhaps most direct—
federal court ruling on the topic, the Sixth Circuit was hardly the first 
court to address the application of res judicata in removal proceedings. 
Before Arangure, circuits had reached different conclusions, resulting 
in obscurity and a haphazard application of the principle. Some circuits 
have applied res judicata in removal proceedings—or have insinuated 
that it may apply.112 Others have limited the application of res judicata 
in removal proceedings or have insinuated that it should not apply at 
all.113 Many of these latter circuits focused their reasoning on the clear 
congressional intent to deport noncitizens convicted of crimes.114 Other 
circuits have yet to directly address the matter or have declined to come 
down one way or the other.115  
There are a couple of wrinkles in the inquiry, especially regarding 
separate convictions. It is unclear whether res judicata should apply 
where there are two convictions and the first proceeding addressed 
only one of the convictions, but the other conviction was known—or 
should have been known—by the government at the time of the first 
 
 112.  See Bravo-Pedroza v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 1358, 1360 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that DHS 
could not bring new deportability charges based on a conviction when a prior removal proceeding 
regarding the same conviction had been terminated); Duvall, 436 F.3d at 387–88 (holding that the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel is incorporated into the INA as long as it “does not frustrate 
congressional intent or impede the effective functioning of the agency”); Medina v. INS, 993 F.2d 
499, 504 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that res judicata applied in a removal proceeding because the 
petitioner’s citizenship was conceded by the government during a prior exclusion proceeding).  
 113.  See Johnson v. Whitehead, 647 F.3d 120, 129 (4th Cir. 2011) (“Courts must thus refrain 
from imposing judge-made preclusion principles on agencies unless such a course is dictated by 
statute.”); Duhaney v. Att’y Gen., 621 F.3d 340, 354 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding that “the Government 
was permitted to lodge new charges of removability, even based on convictions that were 
disclosed” before prior proceedings were terminated); Channer v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 527 
F.3d 275, 282 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that DHS is not required to “lodge all deportation 
charges . . . in a single proceeding”); Yong Wong Park v. Att’y Gen., 472 F.3d 66, 73 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(holding that judicial estoppel did not prevent DHS from alleging a new ground of removability, 
in part because “there is no requirement that the [DHS] advance every conceivable basis for 
[removability] in the [Notice to Appear]” (alteration in original) (quoting De Faria v. INS, 13 
F.3d 422, 424 (1st Cir. 1993))). 
 114.  Duhaney, 621 F.3d at 351 (“The fact that Congress has specifically chosen to amend the 
immigration laws to facilitate the removal of aliens who have committed aggravated felonies 
counsels against an overly rigid application of the res judicata doctrine.”); Channer, 527 F.3d at 
280 n.4 (“[A] doctrine of repose should not be applied so as to frustrate clearly expressed 
congressional intent.”).  
 115.  See, e.g., Cardona v. Holder, 754 F.3d 528, 529–30 (8th Cir. 2014) (declining “to decide 
whether res judicata applies in immigration proceedings” because res judicata would be 
inapplicable either way).  
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proceeding.116 There is agreement, however, that res judicata does not 
apply when a second conviction could not have been known or had not 
yet occurred at the time of the first proceeding.117 Generally, courts 
have not applied res judicata “[w]here a prior conviction is combined 
with a new conviction for purposes of the subsequent proceeding . . . at 
least where the combination qualifies as a new or different ground for 
removal.”118 An example of this would be a charge of removability for 
convictions of “two or more crimes involving moral turpitude.”119 
Suppose a noncitizen were convicted of a criminal offense that 
qualified as a crime involving moral turpitude and DHS charged them 
as removable. They were not found removable for this conviction but 
were subsequently convicted of another criminal offense that DHS 
alleges is a crime involving moral turpitude. DHS would be permitted 
to bring a new removability charge based on this new conviction.120 
Some courts, however, would apply res judicata, prohibiting DHS from 
combining the new conviction with the previously litigated conviction 
to charge the noncitizen as removable for committing two or more 
crimes involving moral turpitude.121  
Moreover, Congress has the power to create new deportability 
charges, making it more difficult to assess a noncitizen’s risk of 
deportation. For example, the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”) amended the INA 
by expanding aggravated felony charges and retroactively applying 
them.122 Thus, if a noncitizen were found not deportable during a 
 
 116.  Compare Channer, 527 F.3d at 281 (“While the remedy for each claim is identical—
deportation for committing an aggravated felony—the contrasting evidence required to prove 
each claim and the different elements of each crime demonstrate that they do not form a 
convenient trial unit.”), and Yong Wong Park, 472 F.3d at 73 (finding it “inappropriate to apply” 
judicial estoppel), with Al Mutarreb v. Holder, 561 F.3d 1023, 1031 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[R]es judicata 
bars [DHS] from ‘initiating a second deportation case on the basis of a charge that [it] could have 
brought in the first case,’ but did not.” (third and fourth alterations in original) (quoting Bravo-
Pedroza, 475 F.3d at 1358)), and Pennington, supra note 39, at 2 n.2 (“[C]laim preclusion could 
bar the Government from initiating a second removal case on the basis of a charge that could 
have been brought in the first instance but was not.”).  
 117.  See, e.g., Whitehead, 647 F.3d at 131 (holding that “repeat offenders” cannot be 
immunized from deportation based on “the termination of earlier removal proceedings”); Duvall, 
436 F.3d at 391 (“Legislative policy dictates that the bar against relitigation must drop when the 
alien continues to commit criminal acts after initial immigration proceedings.”). 
 118.  Moulding, supra note 39, § 2.  
 119.  INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2018). 
 120.  See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
 121.  E.g., Bravo-Pedroza, 475 F.3d at 1360.  
 122.  IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 321(b), 110 Stat. 3009–546, 3009–628 (codified at 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)). 
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removal proceeding prior to 1996, IIRIRA would give DHS the 
authority to assert deportability again based on the same conviction 
used in the previous proceeding, but under a newly established 
aggravated felony theory.123  
Before Arangure, the BIA did not seem to have a clear position 
on res judicata in removal proceedings,124 likely due to the fact that it 
adjudicates claims arising within different circuits.125 Getting a full 
picture is also difficult because only published opinions have binding, 
precedential weight, and the “vast majority of [BIA] decisions are 
unpublished.”126  
B. Arangure v. Whitaker: A Vehicle for Change? 
As the most recent circuit case to address res judicata in removal 
proceedings, Arangure may signal where the doctrine is heading. This 
Section traces the case from the immigration courts to the Sixth Circuit 
and introduces a subsequent case where the BIA declined to follow the 
decision.  
1. Rejection in Immigration Courts.  Ramon Jasso Arangure is a 
Mexican citizen who had legal permanent residency in the United 
States for almost twelve years before he was convicted of a home 
invasion under Michigan law.127 A few months after his conviction, 
DHS charged Ramon as removable for having committed a crime-of-
 
 123.  See Ljutica v. Holder, 588 F.3d 119, 127 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[A previous judgment] cannot 
be given the effect of extinguishing claims which did not even then exist and which could not 
possibly have been sued upon in the previous case.” (quoting St. Pierre v. Dyer, 208 F.3d 394, 400 
(2d Cir. 2000))); Alvear-Velez v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[S]tatutory changes 
that occur after the previous litigation has concluded may justify a new action.”); see also Duhaney 
v. Att’y Gen., 621 F.3d 340, 352 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing to Ljutica and Alvear-Velez but declining to 
decide the issue).  
 124.  Compare In re Kurremula, 2017 WL 4736625, at *2 (B.I.A. Aug. 10, 2017) (following the 
Fifth Circuit in finding that res judicata does apply to removal proceedings), with In re Martins-
Correia, 2017 WL 1045576, at *2 (B.I.A. Jan. 5, 2017) (allowing consideration of a previously 
litigated conviction in a new removal proceeding); see also In re Fedorenko, 19 I. & N. Dec. 57, 
61–62 (B.I.A. 1984) (finding that collateral estoppel applies in removal proceedings for issues 
previously decided in denaturalization proceedings).  
 125.  See supra note 58 and accompanying text.  
 126.  BD. OF IMMIGR. APPEALS, BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS PRACTICE MANUAL 8–
9 (2020), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1250701/download [https://perma.cc/2Z49-
GPNX]; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g)(2) (2020) (establishing publication of precedential 
decisions). 
 127.  In re Jasso Arangure, 27 I. & N. Dec. 178, 178–79 (B.I.A. 2017), vacated, Arangure v. 
Whitaker, 911 F.3d 333 (6th Cir. 2018). 
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violence aggravated felony.128 Later that week, an IJ found him 
removable as charged.129 Ramon promptly appealed to the BIA.130 
While the appeal was pending, the Sixth Circuit decided Shuti v. 
Lynch,131 which held that the applicable portion of the crime of 
violence definition was void for vagueness.132 Because the statute 
underlying DHS’s removability charge was no longer in effect, the BIA 
remanded Ramon’s case and the IJ terminated the proceedings.133 Two 
days later, DHS filed a new removal charge against Ramon: a burglary 
offense, which is an additional aggravated felony arising from the same 
home-invasion conviction.134 Ramon moved to terminate this 
proceeding based on res judicata.135 Denying his motion, the IJ found 
him removable under the new charge.136 Ramon once again appealed 
to the BIA.137 
In Matter of Jasso Arangure,138 the BIA agreed that res judicata 
did not bar DHS’s new claim.139 Despite the two proceedings being 
brought “based on the same conviction and the same charge of 
removability,”140 the court found that “the underlying basis for . . . each 
is different.”141 Under this interpretation, the crime of violence and 
burglary offenses relied on different “operative facts” because the 
proof required and elements of each offense were different.142 The BIA 
asserted that the intervening Sixth Circuit case was unforeseeable and 
that, generally, it was unreasonable to expect DHS to bring all 
 
 128.  Id. at 179. 
 129.  Id.  
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Shuti v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 440 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 132.  Id. at 451. The Supreme Court later held the same statute void for vagueness. Sessions 
v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1223 (2018). Derived from the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, the void for vagueness doctrine holds invalid “a criminal law so vague that it fails 
to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or so standardless that it invites 
arbitrary enforcement.” Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556 (2015).  
 133.  Jasso Arangure, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 179.  
 134.  Id.  
 135.  Id.  
 136.  Id. at 179–80.  
 137.  Id. at 180.  
 138.  In re Jasso Arangure, 27 I. & N. Dec. 178 (B.I.A. 2017), vacated, Arangure v. Whitaker, 
911 F.3d 333 (6th Cir. 2018). 
 139.  Id. at 181.  
 140.  Id. Both charges are aggravated felonies under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2018). 
 141.  Jasso Arangure, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 181. 
 142.  Id. at 181–82.  
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potential charges at once.143 In the BIA’s view, enforcing res judicata 
in removal proceedings would do more harm than good.144 Further, the 
BIA emphasized that Congress has made a clear commitment to 
removing noncitizens convicted of aggravated felonies, warranting a 
more “flexib[le] . . . application of the res judicata doctrine.”145  
This published, and therefore precedential, BIA decision had 
huge ramifications. First, it was unclear whether the ruling was limited 
to the facts at hand or whether it would be extended to cover all 
aggravated felonies, or even other deportability charges,146 such as 
crimes involving moral turpitude. Second, the BIA’s refusal to apply 
res judicata in this context gave DHS the power to “keep fishing for 
legal theories until they find one that a judge will accept.”147 As one 
practitioner put it, Matter of Jasso Arangure “turn[ed] res judicata on 
its head, allowing for the unstable and ‘vexatious litigation’ that 
doctrine was designed to prevent.”148  
2. Revival in the Sixth Circuit.  Ramon appealed the BIA’s decision 
to the Sixth Circuit, which vacated the BIA decision and held that the 
“[r]es judicata doctrine applies in removal proceedings.”149 The court 
reasoned that the BIA should not deviate from the common law res 
judicata principle absent specific direction from Congress.150 The court 
relied on notions of “fairness and reliance” to support its adherence to 
the doctrine.151 Further, the court looked to the INA itself for clues: 
“DHS’s [clear and convincing] burden of proof in each removal 
proceeding . . . would be rendered ‘largely meaningless’ if DHS could 
repeatedly bring one proceeding after another until it got the result it 
wanted.”152  
 
 143.  Id. at 182.  
 144.  See id. (explaining that requiring “DHS to anticipate every possible turn of events and 
charge an alien with all conceivable grounds of removability would not provide the judicial 
economy that is a fundamental goal of res judicata,” in part because “Immigration Judges would 
need to rule on multiple, redundant charges[,] . . . further burden[ing] the already backlogged 
immigration system”). 
 145.  Id. at 183.  
 146.  Triche, supra note 39, at 37. 
 147.  Id.  
 148.  Id. (quoting Alvear-Velez v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2008)). 
 149.  Arangure v. Whitaker, 911 F.3d 333, 345, 347–48 (6th Cir. 2018). 
 150.  See id. at 343 (“Congress legislates against a common-law backdrop and presumably 
does not intend to reject that backdrop with general statutory language.”). 
 151.  Id.  
 152.  Id. at 344 (quoting Duvall v. Att’y Gen., 436 F.3d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 2006)); see also infra 
notes 197–201 and accompanying text. 
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The court did, however, make an important distinction: res 
judicata only prevents DHS from bringing new charges based on the 
same conviction.153 Charges based on different convictions are not 
barred, “even if those convictions could have been raised in the first 
proceeding,” because they constitute “different factual occurrences.”154 
Although the court’s reasoning for this distinction is not quite clear, it 
drew an analogy by citing to § 1003.30.155 
The court found Ramon’s case easily met two of the res judicata 
requirements: the two proceedings “involv[ed] the same parties,” and 
“the non-moving party could have raised the claim at issue” during the 
first proceeding.156 It was undisputed that both proceedings involved 
DHS charges against Ramon and that the burglary aggravated felony 
charge could have been asserted at the same time as the crime-of-
violence aggravated felony charge.157 This left the court to determine 
whether the two proceedings were based on “the same factual 
occurrence” and whether the decision in the first proceeding was 
“final.”158 The court quickly disposed of the BIA ruling that the 
underlying bases of the two charges were different because the 
elements and proof necessary for the two removability charges were 
different.159 Instead, the court found that the two charges were simply 
“two different theories of the case”160 that relied on “the same 
underlying fact: his Michigan home-invasion conviction.”161  
The Sixth Circuit’s decision had another caveat: for the decision 
in the first proceeding to be final for res judicata purposes, the IJ must 
have dismissed the claim with prejudice.162 The court found that it was 
unclear whether the proceeding was terminated with or without 
 
 153.  Arangure, 911 F.3d at 346.  
 154.  Id.  
 155.  See id. (“At any time during deportation or removal proceedings, additional or 
substituted charges . . . may be lodged by [DHS] in writing.” (alteration in original) (quoting 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.30 (2020))).  
 156.  Id. at 345. 
 157.  Id.  
 158.  Id.  
 159.  Id. at 345–46.  
 160.  Id. at 346 (quoting Wilkins v. Jakeway, 183 F.3d 528, 535 (6th Cir. 1999)). 
 161.  Id. at 345; see also id. at 346 (“[A]ny two different legal theories will emphasize different 
aspects of the same facts or rely on some factual details rather than others. But a party’s ‘different 
shading[] of the facts’ does not create two separate factual occurrences for claim preclusion.” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Talismanic Props., LLC v. City of Tipp City, 742 F. App’x 129, 
132 (6th Cir. 2018))). 
 162.  Id. at 347.  
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prejudice.163 Therefore, the court did not rule on the finality of the first 
proceeding and remanded the case for the BIA to determine whether 
the second claim was precluded by the first removal proceeding.164 
3. Resistance to Arangure.  A few months after the Sixth Circuit 
handed down Arangure, the BIA declined to adopt the ruling in a case 
arising out of the Eighth Circuit.165 In Matter of Gavino Quito,166 
defendant Simon Gavino Quito was convicted of statutory rape under 
Minnesota law.167 DHS charged Simon with the crime-of-violence 
aggravated felony, and the IJ and BIA agreed that Simon was 
removable on this ground.168 While the case was on appeal at the 
Eighth Circuit, the Supreme Court handed down Sessions v. Dimaya,169 
finding the relevant definition of “crime of violence” void for 
vagueness.170 Therefore, Simon was no longer removable under the 
crime-of-violence aggravated felony, and the Eighth Circuit remanded 
the case to the BIA.171 
The issue in Matter of Gavino Quito was “whether proceedings 
should be terminated with prejudice . . . or instead be remanded to the 
Immigration Judge to allow the DHS to lodge an additional charge of 
removability.”172 DHS wanted to charge Simon as removable for a 
different aggravated felony.173 Because the court had not issued Simon 
a final removal order, the BIA decided to allow the new charge before 
the IJ.174 
The BIA acknowledged the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Arangure, 
but declined to adopt the ruling because Simon’s case was within a 
different circuit.175 According to the BIA, Simon’s case was also 
 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Id.  
 165.  In re Gavino Quito, 2019 WL 2464431, at *2 (B.I.A. Feb. 13, 2019). 
 166.  In re Gavino Quito, 2019 WL 2464431 (B.I.A. Feb. 13, 2019). 
 167.  Id. at *1.  
 168.  Id.  
 169.  Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018).  
 170.  Gavino Quito, 2019 WL 2464431, at *1; see also supra note 132.  
 171.  Gavino Quito, 2019 WL 2464431, at *1. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  See id. at *2 (citing INA § 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) (2018), which makes 
“murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor” an aggravated felony). It is unclear which of these acts 
DHS was specifically referring to, but presumably, the claim came under either the “rape” or 
“sexual abuse of a minor” prong of the aggravated felony.  
 174.  Id.  
 175.  Id.  
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distinguishable from Arangure because there had been no final 
termination of Simon’s removal proceedings, whereas Ramon’s had 
been officially terminated.176 Despite these differences, the BIA 
explicitly dismissed Arangure.177 This is not surprising as the BIA’s 
decision in Matter of Jasso Arangure is precedential and still applies 
with full force outside of the Sixth Circuit.178 But because the BIA did 
not elaborate on why it found Arangure unpersuasive,179 it remains to 
be seen how the BIA would engage with Arangure in a case arising in 
the Sixth Circuit.180 
III.  THE TEXTUAL AND STRUCTURAL CASE FOR RES JUDICATA IN 
REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS 
Textual and structural guidance are pivotal in untangling this 
precedential maze. Common law principles establish a strong 
presumption that res judicata applies in removal proceedings. 
Furthermore, clues within the INA, its interpretation, and its 
enforcement favor a robust application of res judicata and counsel 
against disrupting the common law presumption. 
A. Res Judicata as a Default 
Although the BIA is typically given Chevron deference in 
interpreting the INA,181 res judicata is a fundamental legal question, 
and there is no evidence that Congress delegated authority over it to 
the BIA.182 In fact, the Supreme Court has regularly resolved questions 
 
 176.  Id. at *2 n.2. 
 177.  Id. at *2. 
 178.  See supra Part II.B.1.  
 179.  Gavino Quito, 2019 WL 2464431, at *2 (stating only that “we do not find Arangure to be 
persuasive, and decline to follow it in the Eighth Circuit”).  
 180.  Of course, the BIA would be legally bound by the Sixth Circuit. See supra note 58 and 
accompanying text. Facing another res judicata question within the Sixth Circuit, the BIA could 
choose to issue a new precedential decision, perhaps partially overruling its decision in Matter of 
Jasso Arangure. More likely, the BIA would attempt to distinguish the case at issue or apply 
Arangure v. Whitaker without disturbing the precedent in other circuits. See infra Part V.B. 
 181.  See supra note 60 and accompanying text.  
 182.  See Reply Brief of Petitioner at 1–2, Arangure v. Whitaker, 911 F.3d 333 (6th Cir. 2018) 
(No. 18-3076) (arguing that the Chevron framework is inapplicable to “the purely legal question 
of whether res judicata applies in removal proceedings,” in part because it “is not the kind of 
question Congress would plausibly assign to agency discretion”); see also Da Silva v. Att’y Gen., 
948 F.3d 629, 635 (3d Cir. 2020) (questioning Chevron’s applicability and the BIA’s expertise 
regarding an issue of statutory construction); Michael Kagan, Chevron’s Liberty Exception, 104 
IOWA L. REV. 491, 495 (2019) (asserting that Chevron is not “meaningfully” applied in removal 
cases). 
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of whether preclusion applies to agency adjudications without any 
mention of Chevron.183 Accordingly, this Note argues that the Chevron 
framework is inapplicable. 
But even if the Chevron framework did apply, deference would 
not be afforded under step one because the INA is unambiguous 
regarding res judicata.184 Although the INA lacks the explicit language 
that courts primarily turn to in evaluating whether a statute is 
ambiguous,185 statutes without clear language, like the INA, can only 
be ambiguous if congressional intent is unclear.186 Congress is assumed 
to legislate against a backdrop of common law principles, such as res 
judicata, unless it expresses clear intent to dispose of them.187 Res 
judicata is in the background of all civil law and is often thought of as 
a default.188 Congress did not disturb this default, which is evidence of 
its intent that “[t]he common-law presumption of res judicata makes 
the INA unambiguous” and leaves no room for deference to the 
BIA.189 Further, res judicata “implicates similar fairness and reliance 
concerns to the presumption against retroactivity,”190 which similarly 
makes a statute unambiguous for Chevron purposes.191 Even assuming, 
 
 183.  See generally B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., 575 U.S. 138 (2015) (Trademark 
Trial and Appeal Board); Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991) (state 
administrative agencies resolving age discrimination claims); United States v. Utah Constr. & 
Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966) (Atomic Energy Commission’s Advisory Board of Contract 
Appeals). Utah Construction was decided before Chevron, further supporting the inquiry’s 
independence from the Chevron framework. Additionally, Chevron has not been mentioned in 
recent Supreme Court cases involving “the BIA’s interpretation of criminal grounds of removal.” 
Kagan, supra note 182, at 524. 
 184.  See supra note 150 and accompanying text; see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43, 843 n.9 (1984) (establishing the primacy of congressional 
intent). 
 185.  See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685 (1985) (“[T]he starting point in 
every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself.” (quoting Blue Chip Stamps 
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring))); Pennington, supra note 
39, at 1 (“There is nothing in the language of the Immigration and Nationality Act regarding issue 
or claim preclusion.”). 
 186.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
 187.  See supra notes 105, 150, and accompanying text. 
 188.  See supra note 105 and accompanying text.  
 189.  Arangure v. Whitaker, 911 F.3d 333, 345 (6th Cir. 2018). 
 190.  Id. at 343. The presumption against retroactivity dictates that statutes are not 
understood to apply to events occurring before their enactment without explicit direction from 
Congress. Id. at 342. Similar to res judicata, “[s]ilence in this situation is a congressional choice, 
not a delegation to the agency.” Id.  
 191.  INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 n.45 (2001) (“Because a statute that is ambiguous with 
respect to retroactive application is construed under our precedent to be unambiguously 
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arguendo, that the INA was entitled to deference under Chevron step 
one, there are persuasive textual and structural reasons why the BIA’s 
interpretation in Matter of Jasso Arangure is unreasonable and would 
not pass Chevron step two.192 Thus, this presumption of res judicata 
should not be disturbed.  
B. The INA: Textual, Interpretative, and Enforcement Clues 
The INA does not include a provision affirming or discounting the 
application of res judicata in immigration proceedings.193 But an 
analysis of the statutory scheme, as well as the judicial approach and 
administrative regulations that flow from it, signal that Congress did 
not intend to disturb the presumption of res judicata. Most notably, 
INA § 238, which establishes special removal procedures for certain 
noncitizens convicted of aggravated felonies, creates an exception to 
preclusion.194 Therefore, Congress’s silence on preclusion elsewhere in 
the INA implies a normal application of the doctrine throughout the 
rest of the statute.195 As the Third Circuit stated, “[t]here would be no 
reason for Congress to include this provision unless it anticipated that 
[preclusion] would otherwise apply in proceedings under the INA.”196 
The clear and convincing burden of proof for deportation, as 
required by INA § 240, is further evidence that res judicata is meant to 
apply.197 The heightened burden placed on DHS signals a congressional 
intent to encourage comprehensive deportation charges and is 
inconsistent with a rejection of res judicata. As the Sixth Circuit noted 
in Arangure, “DHS’s burden of proof in each removal proceeding . . . 
would be rendered ‘largely meaningless’ if DHS could repeatedly bring 
 
prospective, there is, for Chevron purposes, no ambiguity in such a statute for an agency to 
resolve.” (citing Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 264 (1994))). 
 192.  See infra Part III.B.  
 193.  Pennington, supra note 39, at 1.  
 194.  INA § 238(c)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c)(4) (2018) (“Denial of a request for a judicial order 
of removal shall not preclude the Attorney General from initiating removal proceedings . . . upon 
the same ground of deportability or upon any other ground of deportability . . . .”).  
 195.  See Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) 
(“[T]o express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other, or of the alternative.”). 
 196.  Duvall v. Att’y Gen., 436 F.3d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 197.  INA § 240(c)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (“In the proceeding [DHS] has the 
burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that . . . the alien is deportable. No 
decision on deportability shall be valid unless it is based upon reasonable, substantial, and 
probative evidence.”). 
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one proceeding after another until it got the result it wanted.”198 This 
burden must be met with the evidence presented at a hearing,199 and 
the Third Circuit has interpreted this to mean that DHS “bears the 
burden of proving removability based on evidence offered during a 
single immigration hearing.”200 If preclusion doctrines did not apply, 
DHS “would have no real incentive to marshal all of its evidence or 
present its best case” because it could simply try again.201  
Additional clues are found in Supreme Court adjudication of 
deportability charges. The Court employs the categorical approach, 
which aims to avoid “post hoc investigation[s] into the facts of 
predicate offenses.”202 In Moncrieffe v. Holder,203 the Court espoused a 
goal to “promote[] judicial and administrative efficiency by precluding 
the relitigation of past convictions.”204 The Court has also suggested 
that the high costs of relitigating a criminal conviction justify the 
categorical approach, which results in some noncitizens escaping 
removal despite having committed the removable activity.205 These 
values are easily translatable to the res judicata debate and suggest that 
tribunals should prioritize efficiency and limit relitigation, even if it 
means some noncitizens would escape deportation simply because 
DHS did not bring all relevant charges.  
The EOIR regulations designed to enforce the INA provide more 
guidance. The Second Circuit found that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.30 permits 
DHS to bring new claims after a proceeding becomes final.206 This 
infers quite a bit from the regulation. The argument is that the word 
“may” is permissive in that while DHS has the option to bring its claims 
during the proceeding, it may also bring the claims at other times.207 
The more logical interpretation, and the one endorsed by this Note, 
would be that the regulation allows DHS to bring alternative claims 
during the proceeding, but it does not confer the right at any other 
 
 198. Arangure v. Whitaker, 911 F.3d 333, 344 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Duvall, 436 F.3d at 
388). 
 199.  See INA § 240(c)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(1)(A) (“The determination of the 
immigration judge shall be based only on the evidence produced at the hearing.”). 
 200.  Duvall, 436 F.3d at 388 (emphasis added). 
 201.  Id.  
 202.  Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 200 (2013).  
 203.  Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013). 
 204.  Id. at 200. 
 205.  See supra note 85 and accompanying text.  
 206.  See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text. 
 207.  Id. 
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time. Considering administrative efficiency, the EOIR should allow 
new claims to be introduced during the proceeding, but not after. 
During a proceeding, all of the evidence, parties, and resources are 
already convened, and the noncitizen has no final judgment to rely 
upon. It is easier, fairer, and less expensive to introduce a claim during 
a proceeding. Presumably, the EOIR would have included express 
language if it wanted new charges to be brought during or after the 
proceeding.208 Further, it would be redundant for the EOIR to include 
this regulation if DHS had the power to bring these claims at any time; 
as the Second Circuit reads it, the regulation is superfluous.  
Section 1003.30 also helps quell potential concerns about 
requiring DHS to bring all charges at once. Of course, there is always 
a chance that all possible charges will not be apparent at first blush. But 
§ 1003.30 allows DHS to bring new claims during the course of the 
proceeding. This is common for civil litigation, as the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure outline a process for amending pleadings.209 In fact, the 
Federal Rules give plaintiffs less freedom than § 1003.30 gives DHS, as 
ordinary parties must amend their pleadings within twenty-one days or 
else receive consent of the court or other parties.210 DHS is not similarly 
constrained and may amend its charges throughout a proceeding 
without consent.211 Further, the reasons why a party may choose to 
assert new claims in typical civil litigation—like the emergence of new 
facts or evidence—are not as salient in immigration proceedings. Over 
the course of lengthy removal proceedings, the facts and evidence are 
unlikely to change, and at any rate, immigration courts do not look to 
the underlying facts of a conviction in the categorical approach 
analysis.212 The only discoverable fact that likely materially alters the 
proceeding is the existence of a previously unknown conviction. 
Presumably, however, DHS would be able to uncover this conviction 
and analyze whether it warranted an additional charge of deportability 
within the almost year and a half that it has to litigate the matter.213  
Further, under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.47, the BIA can remand the case 
to an IJ who may hold another hearing “[i]f new information is 
 
 208.  Cf. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 329 n.22 (1981) (“We prefer to read the 
statute as written. Congress knows how to say [something] when it means to . . . .”). 
 209.  FED. R. CIV. P. 15. 
 210.  Id. 
 211.  See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 212.  See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 213.  See infra note 273 and accompanying text (describing the average length of removal 
proceedings). 
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presented.”214 At this point, DHS should only be able to bring new 
charges that are truly predicated on information it did not have—or 
could not have had—at the time of the initial hearing. And while 
§ 1003.30 does give DHS the power to bring new charges at any point 
during the proceeding, this could be interpreted to mean that DHS can 
bring charges only before and during the initial hearing.215 In other civil 
cases, amended pleadings are only allowed either before trial or due to 
special circumstances during or after trial.216 The plaintiff failing to 
make their claim during the trial is not one of these special 
circumstances.217 Especially in light of the enormous stakes, DHS 
should not be afforded greater flexibility in its ability to amend 
pleadings when it does not get it right the first time.  
IV.  THE PURPOSIVE CASE FOR RES JUDICATA IN REMOVAL 
PROCEEDINGS 
In addition to the textual and structural evidence just described, 
notions of fairness and good governance also dictate that res judicata 
should apply in removal proceedings. In particular, the principles of 
fairness, finality and reliance, and efficiency that justify the common 
law doctrine apply equally in the immigration setting. Analysis of each 
of these considerations unequivocally demonstrates that the benefits 
of a uniform application of res judicata in removal proceedings 
outweigh any potential drawbacks.  
A. Fairness Dictates Only One Bite at the Apple 
Despite efforts like Operation Streamline218 and expedited 
removal,219 many noncitizens are still going through traditional 
 
 214.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.47(h) (2020). 
 215.  Although ultimately unsuccessful, at least one defendant has argued that a § 1003.30 
“proceeding” only extends through IJ adjudications, not through BIA appeals. In re Gavino 
Quito, 2019 WL 2464431, at *2 (B.I.A. Feb. 13, 2019). 
 216.  FED. R. CIV. P. 15. 
 217.  FED. R. CIV. P. 15(b) (permitting amended pleadings only with the parties’ consent or 
based on an objection at trial).  
 218.  See HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 43, at 230–33 (describing Operation Streamline, which 
aims to criminally prosecute undocumented immigrants “en masse” prior to removal).  
 219.  See generally AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, A PRIMER ON EXPEDITED REMOVAL (2019), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/primer_on_expedited_r
emoval.pdf [https://perma.cc/8J7T-BEPR] (describing a process in which immigration officials 
can circumvent normal court hearings and remove certain immigrants at their discretion). 
Operating largely at the border, expedited removal works against those who are inadmissible but 
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removal proceedings. The average deportation takes about a year and 
a half from the initial notice to appear to the final removal order.220 
Many people in these proceedings are detained during this time.221 Not 
only are detainees taken away from their families, jobs, and homes, but 
detention centers may pose a threat to their mental and physical health. 
A June 2019 DHS Office of the Inspector General report found 
“unsafe and unhealthy conditions . . . at all [four] of the facilities” 
evaluated.222 Violations included “inadequate detainee medical 
care,”223 “spoiled and moldy food,”224 improper segregation 
practices,225 limited access to recreation space,226 “unusable toilets” and 
mold-covered bathrooms,227 lack of hygiene products and properly 
sized clothing,228 unwarranted prohibitions on contact visitation,229 and 
even nooses hanging in cells.230  
Even if a defendant were not detained or could get out on bond, 
they may still face severe hardships. Because there is no Sixth 
Amendment right to effective counsel in civil proceedings,231 
noncitizens must pay for representation, find pro bono services, or 
represent themselves pro se. There is also the logistical issue of getting 
to immigration court. Currently, more than twenty states have no 
 
nevertheless enter the country. Id. at 2; see also supra note 69 and accompanying text (describing 
inadmissibility).  
 220.  See infra note 273 and accompanying text. 
 221.  Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 201 (2013). In fiscal year 2018, 396,448 people were 
booked into detention centers. U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, FISCAL YEAR 2018 ICE 
ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT 8 (2018), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/
about/offices/ero/pdf/eroFY2018Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9NP-SFQQ].  
 222.  OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-19-47, CONCERNS 
ABOUT ICE DETAINEE TREATMENT AND CARE AT FOUR DETENTION FACILITIES 3 (2019), 
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2019-06/OIG-19-47-Jun19.pdf [https://perma.cc/9E89-
STUG].  
 223.  Id. 
 224.  Id.  
 225.  Id. at 5.  
 226.  Id. at 7. 
 227.  Id. at 8.  
 228.  Id. at 9–10.  
 229.  Id. at 11.  
 230.  Id. at 3. 
 231.  See supra note 44 and accompanying text. Criminal defense attorneys do, however, have 
an obligation to counsel their clients on deportation risks. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 
(2010). 
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immigration courts and seventeen states only have one.232 Even though 
Texas has almost a dozen immigration courts,233 a person living in 
northern Texas could have to drive for more than five hours to get to 
the closest immigration court.234 Additionally, emotional turmoil 
comes with the looming threat of deportation, which has been 
described by the Supreme Court as “‘a particularly severe penalty,’ 
which may be of greater concern to a convicted alien than ‘any 
potential jail sentence.’”235 
Findings of deportability may be appealed to the BIA or federal 
courts. Not only can this significantly increase the total length of the 
proceedings, but some noncitizens, even legal permanent residents like 
Adrian Moncrieffe, are actually deported while their appeals are 
pending.236 This makes it extremely difficult to litigate an appeal and 
unjustifiably harms a noncitizen who should not have been deported. 
They may leave behind family, friends, homes, and jobs to “return” to 
a place where they have no support network.237 This was certainly true 
for Adrian, who left behind his citizen wife, his five citizen children, 
and his career when he was deported to a country he had not lived in 
for almost thirty years.238  
In short, removal proceedings can be significant financial, 
logistical, and emotional burdens for noncitizens and their families. 
When someone has been through the lengthy and taxing process and 
has acquired a favorable judgment, fundamental notions of fairness 
dictate that they not be put through the process again.239 In fact, “in 
 
 232.  EOIR Immigration Court Listing, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV. 
(May 29, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/eoir-immigration-court-listing [https://perma.cc/
VW64-PU8N]. 
 233.  Id.  
 234.  This calculation is based on a hypothetical residence in Dalhart, Texas. The closest 
immigration court for nondetained defendants is in Denver, Colorado. Driving Directions from 
Dalhart, TX, to Denver, CO, GOOGLE MAPS, http://maps.google.com [https://perma.cc/A9GB-
6V7N] (follow “Directions” hyperlink; then search starting point field for “Dalhart, TX” and 
search destination field for “Denver, CO”). 
 235.  Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1213 (2018) (quoting Lee v. United States, 137 S. 
Ct. 1958, 1968 (2017)). 
 236.  See supra note 17 and accompanying text.  
 237.  See Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio, 770 F.3d 772, 786 (9th Cir. 2014) (describing the ways 
in which noncitizens may be settled in the United States but detached from their home countries).  
 238.  See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 3, at 4–5. 
 239.  See Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 107–08 (1991) (“To hold 
otherwise would, as a general matter, impose unjustifiably upon those who have already 
shouldered their burdens, and drain the resources of an adjudicatory system with disputes 
resisting resolution.”). 
MULLEN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/17/2020  5:20 PM 
246  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:217 
most instances it is disruptive and unfair to revive a case that has 
already finished.”240 Because of the extended wait times and 
particularly grueling conditions of detention centers, this disruption 
and unfairness are heightened in removal proceedings. 
Moreover, because they do not have a right to counsel, 
immigration defendants may be more likely to agree to whatever terms 
DHS offers them.241 The government wields immense power, and it is 
an abuse of this power to keep bringing claims until it finds one that a 
judge will agree with. It is particularly unfair for the government to 
relitigate these cases when they could have brought the claims the first 
time around. A defendant should not be punished because the 
government chose an unwise litigation strategy.   
B. A Win–Win: Finality and Reliance 
For the immigration system to function properly, all actors must 
be able to rely on decisions and have a clear understanding of when res 
judicata should apply. First, immigration adjudicators have an 
obligation to resolve cases fairly, efficiently, and in line with the INA 
and related regulations.242 The BIA has an additional duty to “provide 
clear and uniform guidance to [DHS], the immigration judges, and the 
general public on the proper interpretation and administration” of the 
law and regulations.243 These duties are of particular importance in a 
system where immigration defendants, who have no right to legal 
counsel and may be detained during proceedings, are likely to be pro 
se defendants with limited access to resources.244 A clear and robust 
application of res judicata could aid the BIA and IJs in fulfilling their 
duties to provide for timely deportation determinations that can be 
relied upon.  
 
 240.  Arangure v. Whitaker, 911 F.3d 333, 343 (6th Cir. 2018). 
 241.  See HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 43, at 111 (“Without counsel, the typical defendant is left 
to fend off the state’s impressive power to punish without the tools needed to navigate legal 
processes.”). 
 242.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1) (2020) (BIA); id. § 1003.10(b) (IJs).  
 243.  Id. § 1003.1(d)(1). 
 244.  See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 201 (2013) (“[N]oncitizens are not guaranteed 
legal representation and are often subject to mandatory detention, where they have little ability 
to collect evidence.” (citing INA § 236(c)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B) (2018); Robert A. 
Katzmann, The Legal Profession and the Unmet Needs of the Immigrant Poor, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 3, 5–10 (2008); Brief for National Immigrant Justice Center et al. as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petitioner at 5–18, Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. 184 (No.11-702); Brief for Immigration Law 
Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 27–32, Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. 184 (No. 11-
702))). 
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Second, giving adjudicators the chance to understand and consider 
all potential grounds of removability at once aids DHS in its mission to 
ensure “the return of all removable aliens to their country of origin.”245 
Thus, bringing all possible claims serves a prophylactic function and 
preserves DHS’s causes of action in the face of uncertainties. For 
example, in its case against Adrian Moncrieffe, DHS protected its 
claim of deportability by bringing multiple charges. Although the 
Court found that his conviction was not an aggravated felony, he was 
still properly deportable for the controlled substances offense.246 Had 
DHS not brought both charges, it would have had to go through the 
trouble of filing new charges, potentially after the case had gone all the 
way to the Supreme Court. Additionally, there may be no way for DHS 
to anticipate that a deportability offense will be found vague, or 
otherwise void, in the courts.247 Recall that Ramon Jasso Arangure was 
charged as removable only under a crime of violence charge later found 
void.248 When DHS sought to charge him as removable for a different 
offense after the proceedings were terminated, he raised a res judicata 
defense.249 It took more than three-and-a-half years to get from the 
initial notice to appear250 to the Sixth Circuit’s decision that res judicata 
applied.251 And even then the Sixth Circuit still did not resolve whether 
DHS could bring the second charge.252 A clear application of res 
judicata would lead to greater certainty for DHS and would prevent 
DHS from having to predict what removability grounds may later be 
superseded or nullified. And, of course, this certainty would aid IJs, the 
BIA, and the federal judiciary as they attempt to navigate the presently 
murky waters of res judicata in removal proceedings, and it would 
prevent inconsistent decisions among different authorities. 
 
 245.  Removal, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.ice.gov/removal 
[https://perma.cc/3LQN-ZKV3]. 
 246.  See Brief for Respondent in Opposition, supra note 29, at 5–6 (stating that Adrian was 
found deportable “as charged” and that he only appealed the aggravated felony ground of 
removal). The aggravated felony designation bars many avenues of relief from removal. See 
HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 43, at 67–90 (describing the eligibility requirements for various forms of 
relief). Because of his particular circumstances, Adrian was likely eligible for relief for the 
controlled substances offense. Totenberg, supra note 1. 
 247.  See supra note 132 and accompanying text.  
 248.  Id. 
 249.  See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 250.  In re Jasso Arangure, 27 I. & N. Dec. 178, 179 (B.I.A. 2017), vacated, Arangure v. 
Whitaker, 911 F.3d 333 (6th Cir. 2018) (“[DHS] issued a notice to appear on April 21, 2015 . . . .”). 
 251.  Arangure v. Whitaker was decided on December 18, 2018. Arangure, 911 F.3d at 333. 
 252.  See supra note 164 and accompanying text.  
MULLEN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/17/2020  5:20 PM 
248  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:217 
To be sure, there could be various reasons why DHS might not 
initially bring all potential removability charges. For example, 
immigration officials may face pressure to carry out enforcement as 
quickly as possible and may only bring the claim perceived as the 
strongest.253 An officer could also make an honest mistake in failing to 
bring all charges, or DHS may attempt to reduce its administrative 
burden in investigating and filing charges. This additional burden 
should not be dismissed, especially in light of the severe immigration 
court backlog. But oftentimes, multiple charges will be brought on the 
same conviction and will not require DHS to conduct much more fact-
finding or legal analysis.254 Even if the charges are based on separate 
convictions, the burden of filing an additional charge at the outset will 
be lighter than the burden of filing an entirely new case—or attempting 
to reopen a case—after a proceeding has concluded. It is simply easier 
to work through all possible theories of removal while the parties are 
convened, allowing adjudicators to make a final determination based 
on all relevant considerations. 
Importantly, this requirement does not infringe on DHS’s 
prosecutorial discretion, but rather it incentivizes DHS to bring 
comprehensive theories of deportability at the outset. DHS officers, 
like prosecutors, have discretion to decide what charges, if any, they 
will bring against noncitizens.255 A broad application of res judicata will 
still allow DHS to make these determinations but will simply require 
DHS to bring all possible charges when any charge is brought—or else 
forfeit them. In this way, res judicata has a similar function in 
 
 253.  See Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 84 Fed. Reg. 35,409 (July 23, 2019) 
(indicating that “prompt removal” is a goal of DHS). 
 254.  Recall that both Adrian Moncrieffe and Ramon Jasso Arangure were charged with two 
different deportability charges predicated on the same conviction—a Georgia marijuana 
conviction and a Michigan home-invasion conviction, respectively. See supra notes 158–61 and 
accompanying text (describing how the Sixth Circuit analyzed Ramon’s two convictions as part 
of the same factual occurrence).  
 255.  See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (“[A]n agency’s decision not to 
prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed 
to an agency’s absolute discretion.”); Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., ICE, to All Field 
Office Directors et al., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration 
Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens 
(June 17, 2011), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-
memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JQN-XEHQ] (describing the scope of ICE’s prosecutorial 
discretion).  
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immigration proceedings as double jeopardy has in criminal 
proceedings: a permissible restraint on prosecutorial discretion.256  
Third, if people are required to follow American laws, they should 
expect the U.S. government will follow them too.257 Part of the 
government’s legitimacy comes from the idea that there are processes 
that will be followed to generate results that people can trust and rely 
on. After the termination of a removal proceeding, noncitizens need to 
be able to go back to their lives with the assurance that their lives will 
not be uprooted by deportation.258 Not only is this necessary for their 
own peace of mind, but it incentivizes people to invest in themselves 
and their communities.259  
Often, deportability charges are lodged against a noncitizen years 
after a conviction.260 Adrian Moncrieffe, for example, was charged as 
deportable two years after he pleaded guilty to the drug offense.261 This 
temporal distance only increases if a noncitizen prevails in a 
proceeding and then is later charged again. In many cases, noncitizens 
have spent years building their lives on the assumption that they are 
not deportable. An emphasis on finality and reliance also supports the 
idea that intervening laws should not unravel res judicata.262 When a 
noncitizen receives a judgment from the courts of this country, they 
deserve assurance that the court’s decision is definitive in the moment 
and will not be upset unless they commit a new offense.  
Lastly, this certainty will help the legal profession, as immigration 
lawyers will be able to better represent their clients. Without a clear 
understanding of how many times a noncitizen can face deportability 
charges for the same—or different—conviction, attorneys are unable 
 
 256.  See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977) (finding that the “double jeopardy 
guarantee serves principally as a restraint on courts and prosecutors”). 
 257.  See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 284 (1990) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (“If we expect aliens to obey our laws, aliens should be able to expect that we will 
obey our Constitution when we investigate, prosecute, and punish them.”).  
 258.  See McLeod v. Peterson, 283 F.2d 180, 183 (3d Cir. 1960) (“[T]here must be an end to 
litigation and thus, to uncertainty, so that officials and other persons may perform their duties 
and conduct their lives on the basis of reasonably firm principles and premises.”). 
 259.  See Mai Thi Nguyen & Hannah Gill, Interior Immigration Enforcement: The Impacts of 
Expanding Local Law Enforcement Authority, 53 URB. STUD. 302, 318 (2016) (describing how 
the threat of deportation negatively impacts civic engagement and economic welfare).  
 260.  See supra note 79.  
 261.  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 3, at 6. 
 262.  See infra Part V.A.2. 
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to confidently advise their clients on the best course of action.263 This 
extends to criminal defense lawyers who craft strategies to avoid 
immigration consequences for their clients, and it could affect many 
client decisions, like whether or not to accept a plea deal. In fact, there 
may be a disincentive for noncitizens to plead guilty to criminal 
offenses because of uncertainty about how it will affect their 
immigration status—now or in the future.  
C. Efficiency When It is Needed Most 
Efficiency is a common goal of government activity, especially 
civil litigation.264 Immigration proceedings are no different in this 
respect. It is good policy to encourage immigration officials to bring all 
possible charges in one proceeding in order to make the most out of 
limited government resources. Res judicata in removal proceedings 
puts pressure on DHS to get it right the first time, which is imperative 
because immigration courts are extremely overwhelmed with no 
reprieve in sight. Yet there remains some flexibility for DHS, as 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.47 provides a way to amend complaints if new charges 
become available during investigations—without initiating 
unnecessary proceedings and wasting valuable resources.265  
At the end of fiscal year 2019, there were 987,274 pending cases 
under EOIR’s purview, a 341-percent increase from fiscal year 2009.266 
This data does not include an additional 322,535 reopened cases that 
had not been calendared.267 Thus, there was an average of more than 
2,000 cases per judge, or more than 3,000 cases per judge if the 
reopened cases were taken into account.268 If the immigration courts 
were to stop accepting new matters today, it would take “an estimated 
4.4 years to work through this accumulated backlog.”269 
 
 263.  See infra note 294 (explaining safe harbor pleas and the Sixth Amendment obligations 
attorneys hold in advising criminal defendants of immigration consequences). 
 264.  See supra notes 101–04 and accompanying text. 
 265.  See supra Part III.B. 
 266.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., ADJUDICATION STATISTICS: 
PENDING CASES (2019), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1060836/download [https:/
perma.cc/XJ9M-N3WT]. 
 267.  Crushing Immigration Judge Caseloads and Lengthening Hearing Wait Times, TRAC 
IMMIGR., (Oct. 25, 2019) [hereinafter TRAC, Lengthening Wait Times], 
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/579 [https://perma.cc/J4YL-ZBX8]. 
 268.  Id.  
 269.  Id. 
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The spike in pending cases is not a result of increased filings but 
rather is due to a backlog of adjudications that are taking longer and 
longer to complete.270 The decision to reopen cases “has caused a much 
greater increase in the court’s backlog than have all currently pending 
cases from families and individuals arrested along the southwest border 
seeking asylum.”271 Although wait times vary drastically by location, 
some immigration courts are scheduling hearings more than four years 
out.272 As of May 2018, cases resulting in removal were spanning an 
average of 501 days from notice to appear to decision.273 This is a 42-
percent increase in length from fiscal year 2016 (the last full fiscal year 
of the Obama presidency).274 These figures do not account for the 
almost 30,000 people who opted to depart the U.S. voluntarily in 
2018.275 It also could not possibly include the additional delays resulting 
from the response to the COVID-19 crisis, which included 
postponement of preliminary master calendar hearings for 
nondetained defendants.276  
The amount of money poured into these adjudications has steadily 
increased as well. For fiscal year 2019, the EOIR received $505 million 
 
 270.  Immigration Court Backlog Jumps While Case Processing Slows, TRAC IMMIGR., (June 
8, 2018) [hereinafter TRAC, Backlog Jumps], https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/516 
[https://perma.cc/5QNV-QHQW]. 
 271.  TRAC, Lengthening Wait Times, supra note 267. 
 272.  Id.  
 273.  TRAC, Backlog Jumps, supra note 270. 
 274.  Id.  
 275.  Christie Thompson & Andrew R. Calderón, More Immigrants Are Giving Up Court 
Fights and Leaving the U.S., MARSHALL PROJECT (May 8, 2019, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/05/08/more-detained-immigrants-are-giving-up-court-
fights-and-leaving-the-u-s [https://perma.cc/K4RJ-U7LC]. 
 276.  See DOJ EOIR (@DOJ_EOIR), TWITTER (Mar. 15, 2020, 10:49 PM), 
https://twitter.com/DOJ_EOIR/status/1239383175882776576 [https://perma.cc/XFY4-YXY6] 
(announcing the postponement beginning March 15, 2020). For example, one of my clients in the 
Duke University School of Law Immigrant Rights Clinic had a master calendar hearing scheduled 
for March 2020, which was rescheduled to January 2023. Of note, master calendar hearings are 
preliminary in nature, and the merits of a case are generally tried at a later individual hearing. 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF THE CHIEF IMMIGR. JUDGE, IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE 
MANUAL 66, 79 (2020), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1284746/download [https:/
perma.cc/VUE2-VW45]. 
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from federal taxes,277 an 88-percent increase from fiscal year 2009.278 
This is in part due to an increase in hiring, with a 90-percent increase 
in judgeships since 2010.279 The EOIR has also opened new 
immigration courts; during September and October 2019 alone, the 
EOIR opened up courts in New York City,280 Sacramento,281 and 
Atlanta.282 Despite these additional resources being directed toward 
immigration adjudication, the backlog has not subsided. Thus, 
procedural measures aimed at efficiency, like a uniform application of 
res judicata, should be implemented to help alleviate this burden.   
The volume and backlog problems currently facing the 
immigration courts are complex consequences of various immigration 
policies and circumstances that are beyond the scope of this Note. 
Although this Note does not argue that inconsistencies in the 
application of res judicata are primary causes of these issues, it does 
suggest that resistance to res judicata is one—among many—of the 
policies behind them. And while it is unclear how many of these 
“reopened” cases would have been barred by a broad and uniform 
application of res judicata, the sheer volume demonstrates that 
revisiting cases places a significant burden on the system. A consistent 
application of res judicata could reduce this burden by cutting 
caseloads and wait times.  
 
 277.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., FY 2020 BUDGET REQUEST AT A 
GLANCE (2019), https://www.justice.gov/jmd/page/file/1142486/download [https://perma.cc/
AZA7-MXLP]. The EOIR requested $673 million for fiscal year 2020, which amounts to a 33-
percent increase from the previous year. Id.  
 278.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., FY 2010 BUDGET REQUEST AT A 
GLANCE (2009), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/jmd/legacy/2014/04/14/eoir-bud-
summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MPM-FB38]. 
 279.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., ADJUDICATION STATISTICS: 
IMMIGRATION JUDGE (IJ) HIRING (2020), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1242156/
download [https://perma.cc/26VT-8TFK]. 
 280.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., NOTICE: EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR 
IMMIGRATION REVIEW TO OPEN NEW YORK – BROADWAY IMMIGRATION COURT (2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/1197226/download [https://perma.cc/MXL6-CUQK]. 
 281.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., NOTICE: EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR 
IMMIGRATION REVIEW TO OPEN SACRAMENTO IMMIGRATION COURT (2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1193011/download [https://perma.cc/X8FW-7ZSL]. 
 282.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., NOTICE: EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR 
IMMIGRATION REVIEW TO OPEN ATLANTA – W. PEACHTREE STREET (2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1206376/download [https://perma.cc/7QDT-VMNK]. 
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V.  THE PATH TOWARD A ROBUST APPLICATION OF RES JUDICATA  
Taking the textual, structural, and purposive arguments together, 
it is clear that res judicata should apply in removal proceedings and 
should be consistently applied among all adjudicatory bodies. Indeed, 
res judicata should apply in the face of multiple convictions, regardless 
of whether new legislation is passed, and sometimes even if the prior 
proceeding was not officially terminated.  
To be clear, this Note does not suggest that a previous removal 
proceeding should foreclose deportability charges based on offenses 
committed after the proceeding; res judicata does not provide a 
warrant to disregard the law. But rather, a finding against deportability 
should be definitive in the moment it is made and hold unless some 
new factual basis arises. 
A. Res Judicata Beyond Arangure  
At a minimum, the Sixth Circuit’s ruling in Arangure should be 
extended to all jurisdictions and tribunals adjudicating removal 
proceedings. But because Arangure only provides for res judicata when 
considering the same underlying conviction and claims dismissed with 
prejudice,283 res judicata should be applied even more broadly. 
Specifically, res judicata should preclude new deportability charges, 
including when there are multiple predicate offenses, when new 
deportability grounds are created, and when a case is not dismissed 
with prejudice. 
1. Multiple Convictions Should Not Always Equal Multiple 
Proceedings.  Res judicata should prohibit relitigation of deportability 
for convictions (or other immigration charges) that could have been 
litigated, in addition to those that have actually been litigated. At the 
very least, the doctrine should cover offenses resulting from the same 
incident because they arise from the same series of facts.284 But, fitting 
in with the principles of res judicata and its goal of efficiency, this Note 
argues that it makes most sense to require DHS to bring all possible 
deportability charges at once.  
Despite arguments that this would lead to overly complex 
litigation,285 it would be easier for DHS to review a noncitizen’s file 
 
 283.  See supra Part II.B.2. 
 284.  See supra notes 159–61 and accompanying text.  
 285.  See, e.g., De Faria v. INS, 13 F.3d 422, 424 (1st Cir. 1993) (“[S]uch a rule would needlessly 
complicate proceedings in the vast majority of cases.”). 
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once, send them one notice to appear, and require them to come to 
court one time. Immigration officials who spend their careers 
adjudicating these matters have the institutional capacity to effectively 
juggle multiple charges and convictions in one efficient proceeding.286 
Conversely, another argument against requiring DHS to bring all 
claims at once is that it might result in redundancy.287 Redundancy is 
almost certain to occur to some degree when multiple charges are 
brought based on the same underlying conviction. For example, the 
court likely looked at identical evidence for both of Adrian 
Moncrieffe’s deportability charges, an illicit-trafficking aggravated 
felony and a controlled substances offense predicated on the same 
Georgia conviction. But this would only make it easier for the judge to 
quickly rule on multiple theories of deportation. It seems extremely 
unlikely that bringing multiple claims in one removal proceeding would 
absorb more time and resources than two separate, successive 
proceedings but extremely likely that adjudicators could effectively 
assess multiple charges concurrently. 
Although in some cases separate convictions are based on the 
same underlying facts, oftentimes they are not. Multiple convictions 
pose an issue in applying the “same claim” prong of res judicata. This 
problem can be avoided by interpreting the “claim” to refer to the 
general charge of deportability instead of the conviction(s) or 
offense(s) underlying the charge. Multiple convictions may even be 
considered part of “the same transaction or series of transactions” that 
typically warrant res judicata.288 This framing is the most logical as the 
general claim asserted by DHS is that a noncitizen is deportable. 
Although there may be several theories supporting that claim, they 
should not be tried separately for purposes of fairness and finality. 
Further, a favorable finding should be definitive at the moment it is 
 
 286.  Cf. Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85, 91 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (finding that juries are 
capable of juggling multiple criminal charges in one trial). In fact, all claims must be consolidated 
in appeals to the federal courts. INA § 242(b)(9), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) (2018) (“Judicial review 
of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and application of constitutional and 
statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from 
the United States under this subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order 
under this section.”); see also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 313 (2001) (finding that the “purpose” 
of INA § 242(b)(9) is “to consolidate ‘judicial review’ of immigration proceedings into one action 
in the court of appeals”); supra note 100 and accompanying text (explaining that plaintiffs in other 
civil suits are expected to bring all claims at once). 
 287.  See supra note 144. 
 288.  See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
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made, which cannot be possible if other existing convictions are fodder 
for additional deportation charges. 
2. In the Face of New Legislation.  Traditional notions of fairness 
and due process require the law to be accessible and to give individuals 
the opportunity to “conform their conduct accordingly.”289 Thus, 
“settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted.”290 Despite 
precedent to the contrary,291 these same notions of fairness should 
apply in cases where a certain crime was not a deportable offense at 
the time of conviction, but later became deportable through new 
legislation.  
This issue was particularly salient after the passage of IIRIRA, 
which greatly expanded the definition of aggravated felony.292 IIRIRA 
explicitly applies to convictions that were entered prior to the law’s 
enactment.293 This raises serious due process and notice concerns 
because a defendant may make a decision in a criminal proceeding 
based on the applicable immigration consequences. For example, a 
defendant may plead guilty to reduce their sentence if under the 
impression that it would likely not result in negative immigration 
consequences.294 If this same defendant is then unsuccessfully charged 
with deportability, Congress could later change the deportability 
statutes to include more offenses, and, without res judicata, DHS could 
charge the defendant with a new deportability offense based on the 
initial conviction. In such a case, the defendant may have spent years 
thinking he was safe from deportation only to have that reasonable 
assumption voided by new legislation. 
Although the statutory language of IIRIRA unambiguously 
applies to a conviction regardless of whether it was entered before or 
after IIRIRA’s enactment,295 the creation of a new, retroactive cause 
 
 289.  St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 316 (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994)). 
 290.  Id.  
 291.  See supra note 123. 
 292.  See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 293.  Id. 
 294.  See Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1987 (2015) (acknowledging “safe harbor” pleas 
entered for the explicit purpose of avoiding immigration consequences); see also Padilla v. 
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 359 (2010) (detailing a defendant who pleaded guilty because he was 
misinformed of the immigration consequences). In Padilla v. Kentucky, the Court found that Sixth 
Amendment protections require counsel to advise criminal clients on potential immigration 
consequences. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 368–69. Failure to do so can constitute ineffective assistance of 
counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366.  
 295.  See supra note 122 and accompanying text.  
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of action should not wipe away settled common law principles. IIRIRA 
allows DHS to remove noncitizens who were not previously 
deportable, but this does not mean that DHS should be able to 
relitigate previously decided cases under a new theory. Nowhere in 
IIRIRA is it implied that the expanded definition of aggravated felony 
gives DHS a do-over. But rather, IIRIRA and similar statutes should 
be interpreted only to give DHS the authority to bring new 
deportability charges based on convictions that had not been the 
subject of prior removal proceedings.  
3. A More Lenient Finality Standard.  A uniform application of res 
judicata has greater effect if more removability determinations are 
considered final. As such, this Note endorses regulatory interpretations 
and a view of remand that promote finality and prevent the 
perpetuation of issues that were—or should have been—settled.  
Recall that one of the Sixth Circuit’s caveats in Arangure was that 
res judicata could not apply unless the IJ had dismissed the case with 
prejudice. However, the regulation defining finality, 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.39, makes no mention of dismissals with or without prejudice, 
and no such affirmative requirement should be read into the 
regulation. Another regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2, establishes that 
certain proceedings are dismissed or remanded without prejudice by 
default.296 But, as an administrative regulation, § 1239.2 does not 
undermine Congress’s intent that res judicata should apply. Instead, a 
plausible reading of the regulation could limit future proceedings to 
adjudications based on new—or newly discovered—convictions or 
offenses.  
It has also been suggested that res judicata does not apply when a 
noncitizen wins an appeal and the case is then remanded to allow DHS 
to bring new charges.297 But this view would allow tribunals to 
completely circumvent res judicata by declining to terminate the 
proceeding or dismiss it with prejudice; therefore, the noncitizen could 
never have a “final” decision to fall back on. By keeping the 
“proceeding” alive, this model permits DHS to keep bringing new 
claims after failing to make its case. Thus, if the application of res 
 
 296.  8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(c), (d) (2020). 
 297.  See supra note 174 and accompanying text.  
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judicata in removal proceedings is to have any force, this type of 
workaround must be foreclosed.298  
Further, these additional barriers to finality and res judicata are 
not necessary in light of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.47, which permits the BIA to 
remand a case if new facts arise. If an additional charge becomes 
available based on newly disclosed or discovered information, then 
§ 1003.47 allows IJs to hold another hearing. Outside of this 
circumstance, a dismissal without prejudice or a remand could unjustly 
allow DHS officials to bring new charges that were available during the 
first hearing before the IJ. As such, unless § 1003.47 applies, a finding 
on deportability should be deemed final as soon as all of the original 
charges have been litigated. 
B. Potential Paths to Justice 
Uniformity in this comprehensive application of res judicata could 
be achieved in a number of ways. The easiest way would be for DHS 
or the EOIR to adopt a blanket res judicata policy for removal 
proceedings.299 Specifically, DHS could create a regulation that 
requires its officers to bring all possible charges at once as well as limit 
the scenarios in which new charges may be brought. The EOIR could 
also promulgate one or more regulations to create explicit procedural 
requirements in line with the solution detailed by this Note. At the very 
least, the EOIR could amend the language in § 1003.30 to clarify when 
DHS can bring new charges and resolve the conflicting interpretations 
of the present regulation, especially around the use of the word “may.” 
It should also consider amending § 1239.2 to limit the circumstances in 
which IJs are dismissing and remanding proceedings without prejudice. 
The BIA could also issue a new, precedential decision to replace 
Matter of Jasso Arangure. However, its relatively recent unpublished 
decision in Matter of Gavino Quito, which outright refuses to engage 
with the Sixth Circuit decision in Arangure, signals that a new, 
precedential decision is unlikely, at least in the current administration. 
Alternatively, the attorney general could overrule Matter of Jasso 
Arangure and issue a new, precedential decision in its place.300 This 
 
 298.  Cf. Romero v. Barr, 937 F.3d 282, 293–94 (4th Cir. 2019) (finding power to 
administratively close was “appropriate and necessary” because without it “the proceedings may 
have continued indefinitely as the file shuttled back and forth between the two DHS divisions”).  
 299.  See INA § 103(a)(3), (g)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3), (g)(2) (2018) (granting the secretary 
of DHS and the attorney general the power to establish regulations).  
 300.  See supra note 56 and accompanying text.  
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seems equally unlikely because, although Attorney General William 
Barr and previous attorneys general in the Trump administration have 
issued more immigration decisions than attorneys general of other 
administrations, their decisions have significantly restricted 
protections for noncitizens.301 
Of course, Congress could also amend the INA to explicitly apply 
res judicata in removal proceedings and directly address the different 
wrinkles involving multiple convictions, intervening laws, and 
loopholes. But it has been more than three decades since the last 
comprehensive immigration bill was signed into law.302 Congress is now 
at a “gridlock” and unable “to forge a bipartisan consensus on 
immigration.”303 And even though this Note proposes a relatively 
modest amendment, it seems doubtful that Congress would mobilize 
around the issue or address it outside of an omnibus bill.  
Federal courts could also take the lead. Although Arangure was 
not appealed to the Supreme Court, the BIA’s dismissal of the decision 
signals tension of authority. With an increase in immigration cases 
pending before our courts, this conflict will likely arise again. Circuit 
courts should take steps to align their jurisprudence with the Sixth 
Circuit, chipping away at the precedential effect of Matter of Jasso 
Arangure. This method would create incremental change and would 
not achieve the comprehensive application that this Note articulates. 
But other circuits could and should take a broader approach than the 
Sixth Circuit did in Arangure. Of course, the Supreme Court, if 
presented with the opportunity, could take up the issue to achieve 
uniformity across all tribunals. Although this Note does not attempt to 
predict how the current Court would come down on the issue of res 
 
 301.  See, e.g., In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (Att’y Gen. 2018) (overruling a precedential 
BIA decision and eliminating asylum protections based on domestic and gang violence); Kim 
Bellware, On Immigration, Attorney General Barr is His Own Supreme Court. Judges and 
Lawyers Say That’s a Problem, WASH. POST (Mar. 5, 2020, 9:51 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/2020/03/05/william-barr-certification-power 
[https://perma.cc/T4R3-MSKQ]; Adiel Kaplan, AG Barr Issues 2 Decisions Limiting Ways 
Immigrants Can Fight Deportation, NBC NEWS (Oct. 29, 2019, 12:43 PM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/ag-barr-issues-2-decisions-limiting-ways-
immigrants-can-fight-n1073026 [https://perma.cc/FP32-VLQT]; Dara Lind, Jeff Sessions Is 
Exerting Unprecedented Control over Immigration Courts—By Ruling on Cases Himself, VOX 
(May 21, 2018, 1:06 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/5/14/17311314/
immigration-jeff-sessions-court-judge-ruling [https://perma.cc/V4S8-Q4X2].  
 302.  Elaine Kamarck & Christine Stenglein, Can Immigration Reform Happen? A Look 
Back, BROOKINGS (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2019/02/11/can-
immigration-reform-happen-a-look-back [https://perma.cc/8VUP-H5XB].  
 303.  Id. 
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judicata in removal proceedings, at the very least, recent caselaw 
indicates that the Court is prepared to affirm presumptions of statutory 
construction and relies heavily on statutory context in its 
interpretations of the INA.304 This may bode well for the solution 
promoted in the Note, which is strongly supported by the common law 
presumption of res judicata and by the statutory context of the INA.  
CONCLUSION 
Without a Supreme Court decision to guide our application of res 
judicata in removal proceedings, we must turn to inconsistent 
precedent across multiple tribunals in two different branches of 
government. In light of the recent Sixth Circuit decision, Arangure v. 
Whitaker, and the BIA’s subsequent dismissal of the doctrine, it is time 
to adopt a uniform rule. A thorough analysis of the INA, judicial 
interpretations, and corresponding enforcement uncovers textual, 
structural, and purposive reasons for applying res judicata. A 
comprehensive and uniform application of the doctrine would improve 
outcomes for DHS and provide clarity for lawyers and adjudicators. 
Similarly, limiting DHS to only one bite at the deportation apple would 
help alleviate the burden on the immigration adjudicatory system while 
promoting fairness and justice for the noncitizens subject to it.  
 
 
 304.  Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062, 1069–70 (2020) (finding that a presumption 
of judicial review for executive action applies in interpreting INA § 242). While this is not 
perfectly analogous to a case involving the common law presumption of res judicata, this decision 
may signal the Court’s willingness to read presumptions into the INA and intervene when 
executive and judiciary powers are in conflict. 
